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Abstract
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers diﬀer in
their prior information, and hence in their willingness to pay for additional signals.
The monopolist can proﬁtably oﬀer a menu of experiments. We show that, even under
costless information acquisition and free degrading of information, the optimal menu
is quite coarse. The seller oﬀers at most two experiments, and we derive conditions
under which ﬂat vs. discriminatory pricing is optimal.
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Introduction

We consider a monopolist who wishes to sell information about a payoﬀ-relevant variable (the “state”) to a single buyer. The buyer faces a decision problem, and the seller
has access to all the information that is relevant for solving it. In addition, the buyer
is partially and privately informed about the relevant state variable. For example, the
buyer’s private information may concern his beliefs over the state, or directly his preferences over certain actions. Within this context, we investigate the revenue-maximizing
policy for the seller. How much information should the seller provide? And how should
the seller price the access to the database?
We are initially motivated by the role of information in markets for online advertising. In that context, advertisers can tailor their spending to the characteristics of
individual consumers. Large data holders compile databases with consumers’ browsing
and purchasing history. Advertisers are therefore willing to pay in order to acquire
information about each consumer’s proﬁle. A contract between a buyer and a seller
of data then speciﬁes which consumer-speciﬁc attributes the seller shall release to the
advertiser before any impressions are purchased. An alternate example is given by
vendors of information about speciﬁc ﬁnancial assets. In that case, the buyer could
be any investor, such as a bank, who wishes to acquire a long or short position on a
stock, based on its underlying fundamentals. Finally, one may consider the problem
of a manager seeking access to the “knowledge database” of a consultant in order to
steer his ﬁrm in the right direction.
In all these examples, the monopolist sells information. In particular, the products
being oﬀered are experiments à la Blackwell, i.e. signals that reveal information about
the buyer’s payoﬀ-relevant state. As the buyer is partially informed, the value of any
experiment depends on his type. The seller’s problem is then to screen buyers with
heterogeneous private information by oﬀering a menu of experiments. In other words,
the seller’s problem reduces to the optimal versioning of information products.1
A long literature in economics and marketing has focused on the properties of information goods. This literature emphasizes how low marginal costs and digitalized
production allow sellers to easily degrade (more generally, to customize) the attributes
of such products (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). This argument applies even more forcefully to information products, i.e. experiments, and makes versioning an attractive
price-discrimination technique (Sarvary, 2012). In this paper, we investigate the validity of these claims in a simple contracting environment.
1

For example, recall the case of the Consumer Sentiment Index released by the University of Michigan
and Thomson-Reuters, which was initially available in diﬀerent versions, based on the timing of its release.
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Environment The seller does not know the true state, but she can design any
experiment ex-ante. The seller’s problem is therefore to design and to price an “information product line” to maximize expected proﬁts. An “information product line”
consists of a menu of experiments, and we characterize the optimal menu for the seller
in this environment. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to analyze a seller’s
problem of optimally “packaging” information in diﬀerent versions.
The distinguishing feature of our approach to pricing information is that payments
cannot be made contingent on the buyer’s actions or on the realized states. That
is, actions and states are not contractible. Consequently, the value of an allocation
(i.e., an information structure) is independent of its price. This allows us to cast
the problem into the canonical nonlinear pricing framework. Clearly, this also leaves
open the question of how much more can be achieved in terms of proﬁts in a richer
contracting environment.
Finally, despite the buyer being potentially informed about his private beliefs, the
analysis diﬀers considerably from a belief-elicitation problem: the buyer’s type (beliefs
or tastes) acts as a speciﬁc parameter in the demand for information.

Results Because information is only valuable if it induces to change one’s optimal
action, buyers with heterogeneous beliefs and tastes will rank experiments diﬀerently.
More precisely, all buyer types agree on the highest-value information structure (i.e., the
perfectly informative experiment), but their ranking of distorted information structures
diﬀers substantially.
This is, in fact, a peculiar property of information as a product. Outside of very
special examples, buyers have heterogeneous ordinal preferences for signals, which induces a trade-oﬀ for the seller between the precision of an experiment (vertical quality)
and its degree of targeting (horizontal positioning). At the same time, this asymmetry
in buyers’ valuations allows the seller to extract more surplus. In our context, this
is achieved by oﬀering a slightly richer menu than, for instance, in Mussa and Rosen
(1978).
We ﬁnd that bundling information is optimal quite generally. For regular or symmetric distributions, the intuition from Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) applies, and the
seller adopts ﬂat pricing. However, the ﬂat pricing result depends heavily on the distribution of types. With a general distribution, ironing and discriminatory pricing emerge
naturally as part of the optimal menu.
Even in environments where virtual values are linear in the allocation, the seller
can exploit diﬀerently informative signals. Thus, unlike in Myerson (1981) or Riley
and Zeckhauser (1983), the seller oﬀers more than just the maximally informative
experiment at a ﬂat price. In particular, the optimal menu consists of (at most) two
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experiments: one is fully informative; and the other (if present) contains one signal
that perfectly reveals one realization of the buyer’s underlying state. This property is
best illustrated in a binary-type model, but holds more generally any time a seller has
the ability to version its product along more than one dimension.

Related Literature This paper is tied to the literature on selling information. It
diﬀers substantially from classic papers on selling ﬁnancial information (Admati and
Pﬂeiderer, 1986, 1990), as well as from the more recent contributions of Eső and Szentes
(2007b) and Hörner and Skrzypacz (2012).
We then discuss diﬀerences with a model of disclosure. In such a model, the seller
of a good discloses horizontal match-value information, in addition to setting a price.
Several papers, among which Ottaviani and Prat (2001), Johnson and Myatt (2006),
Eső and Szentes (2007a), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), and Li and Shi (2013),
have analyzed the problem from an ex-ante perspective. In these papers, the seller
commits (simultaneously or sequentially) to a disclosure rule and to a pricing policy.
More recent papers, among which Balestrieri and Izmalkov (2014), Celik (2014), and
Koessler and Skreta (2014) take an informed-principal perspective. Abraham, Athey,
Babaioﬀ, and Grubb (2014) study vertical information disclosure in an auction setting.
Finally, the commitment to a disclosure policy is also present in the literature on
Bayesian persuasion, e.g. Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
However, these papers diﬀer from our mainly because of (i) lack of transfers, and (ii)
the principal derives utility directly from the agent’s action.

2

Model

We consider a model with a single agent (a buyer of information) facing a decision
problem. We maintain throughout the paper the assumption that the buyer must
choose between two actions.
a ∈ A = {aL , aH } .
In this section, we assume the relevant state for the buyer’s problem is also binary,
ω ∈ Ω = {ωL , ωH } .
The buyer’s objective is to match the state. In our applications, an advertiser
wishes to purchase impressions only to consumers with a high match value; an investor
wants to take a short or long position depending on the underlying asset’s value; and
a manager wants to adopt the right business strategy.
We will consider for now a fully symmetric environment, and let the buyer’s ex-post
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utility u (a, ω) from taking action a in state ω be given by
a = aL a = aH
ω = ωL

0

−1

ω = ωH

0

1

Note that with only two actions, it is without loss to assume that the state ω equals
the buyer’s payoﬀ from taking the “high action” aH , net of the payoﬀ from choosing aL .
The buyer and the seller have a common prior belief
p = EF [θ] .
In addition, the buyer privately observes an informative signal. We denote the buyer’s
interim belief by
θ = Pr (ω = ωH ) .
The distribution of interim beliefs F (θ) is common knowledge to the buyer and the
seller.2
A strategy for the seller consists of a menu of experiments and associated tariﬀ
M = {E, t}, with
E = {E}

t : E → R+ .

An experiment E ∈ E consists of a set of signals and a probability distribution mapping
states into signals.
E = {SE , πE }

πE : Ω → SE .

Signals are conditionally independent from the buyer’s private information.
With the independence assumption, we are adopting the interpretation of a buyer
querying a database, or request a diagnostic service. In particular, the buyer and the
seller draw their information from independent sources. Under this interpretation, the
seller does not know the realized state ω at the time of contracting. The seller can,
however, augment the buyer’s original information with arbitrarily precise signals.
For instance, with the online advertising application in mind, the buyer is privately
informed about the average returns to advertising. The seller can, however, improve
the precision of his estimate consumer by consumer. The two parties therefore agree
to a contract by which the seller discloses speciﬁc attributes of individual consumers
upon the buyer’s request. Thus, even if the seller is already endowed with a complete
2
In order to interpret the model as a continuum of buyers, we shall assume that states ω are identically
and independently distributed across buyers, and that buyers’ private signals are conditionally independent.
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database, she does not know the realized state of the actual buyer at the time of
contracting.
To conclude the description of the model, we summarize the timing of the game:
(i) the buyer observes an initial signal, and forms his interim belief θ; (ii) the seller
oﬀers a menu of experiments M; (iii) the buyer chooses an experiment E, and pays
the corresponding price t; (iv) the buyer observes a signal s from the experiment E
(given the true state ω); and ﬁnally (v) the buyer chooses an action a.

3

The Seller’s Problem

In this section, we begin by deﬁning the demand for information of each buyer type.
Let u(θ) denote the buyer’s payoﬀ under partial information
u (θ)  max Eθ [u (a, ω)] .
a∈A

The value of experiment E for type θ is then equal to the net value of augmented
information,
V (E, θ)  EE,θ [max Es,θ [u (a, ω)]] − u (θ) .
a∈A

We now characterize the menu of experiments that maximizes the seller’s proﬁts.
Because the Revelation Principle applies to this setting, we may state the seller’s
problem as designing a direct mechanism
M = {E (θ) , t (θ)}.
that assigns an experiment to each type of the buyer. Because we have assumed no
costs of acquiring information, the seller’s problem consists of maximizing the expected
transfers subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality:

max

{E(θ),t(θ)}

s.t.

t (θ) dF (θ) ,

   
 
V (E (θ) , θ) − t (θ) ≥ V E θ , θ − t θ

∀ θ, θ ,

V (E (θ) , θ) − t (θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ.

3.1

Buyer’s Utility

The seller’s problem can be immediately simpliﬁed by taking advantage of the binaryaction framework. In particular, we can reduce the set of optimal experiments to a
very tractable class.
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Lemma 1 (Binary Signals).
Every experiment in an optimal menu consists of two signals only.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: suppose the seller were to oﬀer
experiments with more than two signals; she could then combine all signals in experiment E(θ) that lead to the same choice of action for type θ; clearly, the value of this
experiment V (E(θ), θ) stays constant for type θ (who does not modify his behavior);
in addition, because the original signal is strictly less informative than the new one,
V (E(θ), θ ) decreases (weakly) for all θ = θ.
Therefore, we may focus on experiments with binary signals:
sL
E (θ) =

sH
1 − β(θ) .

ωL

β(θ)

ωH

1 − α(θ)

α(θ)

Throughout the paper, we adopt the convention that α(θ) + β(θ) ≥ 1 (else we should
relabel the signals sL and sH . We shall also refer to the diﬀerence in the conditional
probabilities α and β as the relative informativeness of an experiment.
We now derive the value of an arbitrary experiment. In particular, the value of
experiment (α, β) for type θ is given by
V (α, β, θ) = [(α − β) θ + β − (1 − θ) − max{0, 2θ − 1}]+ .
Figure 1 shows the value of information for two particular experiments. The ﬁrst
experiment is fully informative. The second experiment contains a signal (sL ) that
fully reveals state ωL , and a partially informative signal (sH ).

Figure 1: Value of Experiment (α, β)


































(α, β) = (1, 1)

(α, β) = (1, 1/2)
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Notice that the value of information includes both level eﬀects (terms depend on
the allocation or type only) and interaction eﬀects. In particular, the shape of the
buyer’s reservation utility implies that V (α, β, θ) peaks at θ = 1/2 for all experiments.
Conversely, extreme types have no value of information.3
Note that the allocation and the buyer’s type interact only through the diﬀerence
in the experiment’s relative informativeness α − β. This is clear from Figure 1. A more
optimistic type has a relatively higher value for experiments with a high α because
such experiments contain a signal that perfectly reveals the low state. Because this
induces types θ > 1/2 to switch their action (compared to the status quo), these types
have a positive value of information for any experiment with α = 1.
Perhaps more importantly, the speciﬁc interaction of type and allocation in the
buyer’s utility means that the seller can increase the value of an experiment at the
same rate for all types. In particular, increasing α and β holding α − β constant, and
increasing the price at the same rate, the seller does not alter the attractiveness of the
experiment for any buyer who is considering choosing it.
The next result allows us to further simplify the class of optimal strategies for the
seller.
Lemma 2 (Partially Revealing Signals).
Every experiment in an optimal menu has α = 1 or β = 1.
In other words, at least one signal perfectly reveals one state in any experiment part
of an optimal menu. Clearly, this result suggests a one-dimensional allocation rule
q(θ)  α(θ) − β(θ) ∈ [−1, 1] .
With this notation, two distinct information structures q ∈ {−1, 1} correspond to
releasing no information to the buyer. (These are the two experiments that show the
same signal with probability one.) We should also point out that (because of Lemma
2), a negative value of q implies β = 1 and a positive q implies α = 1. The fully
informative experiment is given by q = 0. We summarize all optimal experiments in
the tables below.

E=

sL

sH

ωL

1−q

q

ωH

0

1

E=

ωL
ωH

1≥q≥0

sL

sH

1

0

−q 1 + q

0 ≥ q ≥ −1

3

Note that buyer types with degenerate beliefs do not expect any contradictory signals to occur, and
hence they are not willing to pay for such experiments. More generally, a buyer’s willingness to pay does
not depend on whether he holds correct beliefs.
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We may then rewrite the value of experiment q ∈ [−1, 1] for type θ ∈ [0, 1] as
follows:
V (q, θ) = [θq − max{q, 0} + min{θ, 1 − θ}]+ .

(1)

It can be useful, at this point, to pause and discuss similarities between our demand
function and those obtained in traditional screening models (i.e., when sellers oﬀer
physical goods).
All buyer types value the vertical “quality” of information structures, as measured
by their participation constraint (which is reﬂected in the min term). Note, however,
that the utility function V (q, θ) has the single-crossing property in (θ, q). This indicates that buyers who are relatively more optimistic about the high state ωH assign
a relatively higher value to information structures with a high q. In particular, very
optimistic types have a positive willingness to pay for experiments with α = 1 because
such experiments contain signals that perfectly reveal the low state ωL .
Figure 2 shows the value assigned to diﬀerent experiments q by two types that are
symmetric about 1/2.
V
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05

-1.0

-0.5

0.5

1.0

q

Figure 2: V (q, θ), θ ∈ {1/3, 2/3}
Though the seller’s problem is reminiscent of classic nonlinear pricing, we uncover
a novel aspect of horizontal diﬀerentiation. This feature is linked to the relative informativeness of an experiment. Furthermore, the quality and “positioning” of an
information product cannot be chosen separately by the ﬁrm. The information nature
of the good induces a technological constraint (which given by the formula for q) that
limits the asymmetric informativeness of an experiment, holding constant its quality
level.4
4

It is then diﬃcult to imagine a non-information analog for our demand function.
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To summarize, we present a canonical model for selling information that nonetheless
diﬀers from existing screening models along several dimensions: (a) buyers have typedependent participation constraints; (b) experiment q = 0 is the most valuable for
all types; (c) a speciﬁc buyer type (θ = 1/2) always has the highest pay for any
information structure; (d) buyers are horizontally diﬀerentiated with respect to the
relative informativeness of experiments.

3.2

Incentive Compatibility

We now use the structure of the problem in order to derive a characterization of implementable allocations q(θ). In particular, the buyer’s utility function in (1) has a
downward kink in θ. As discussed earlier, this follows from having an interior type
assign the highest value to any allocation (and from the linearity of the buyer’s problem).
Therefore, we compute the buyer’s rents U (θ) on [0, 1/2] and [1/2, 1] separately.
We ﬁrst recognize that the buyer’s rents will be non-decreasing on the ﬁrst subinterval
and non-increasing on the second. Thus, the participation constraint will bind at θ = 0
and θ = 1, if anywhere. Furthermore, types θ = 0 and θ = 1 have no value for any
experiment, and must therefore receive the same utility.
We then apply the envelope theorem to each subinterval separately, and we impose
a continuity requirement on the rent function U (θ) at θ = 1/2. This restriction yields
an extra condition,


1/2

U (1/2) = U (0) +
0


Vθ (q, θ)dθ = U (1) −

1
1/2

Vθ (q, θ)dθ.

Such a condition can always be written for any type. What is new here is that no
further endogenous variables (e.g. U (θH ) in Mussa and Rosen, 1978) appear. It is
more useful in our context as a consequence of having two extreme types with zero
value of information. Diﬀerentiating (1) and simplifying, we can express the above
condition as



1/2

U (1/2) =


(q (θ) + 1)dθ = −

0

1

(q (θ) − 1)dθ,

1/2

and hence obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 (Implementable Allocations).
The allocation q (θ) is implementable if and only if
q (θ) ∈ [−1, 1] is non-decreasing,


1

q (θ) dθ = 0.
0

10

The integral constraint is a requirement for implementability. As such it is not
particularly meaningful to analyze the relaxed problem. This is in contrast with other
instances of screening under integral constraints (e.g., constraints on transfers due
to budget or enforceability, or capacity constraints). Finally, the resemblance to a
persuasion budget constraint is purely cosmetic.
We can now state the the seller’s problem, and give its solution in the next section.
(In the Appendix we characterize the transfers associated with allocation rule q(θ) in
the usual way.)
1 



θ+

max
q(θ)

0

F (θ)
f (θ)




q (θ) − max {q (θ) , 0} f (θ) dθ,

(2)

s.t. q (θ) ∈ [−1, 1] non-decreasing,
 1
q (θ) dθ = 0.
0

4

Optimal Menu

We now fully solve the seller’s problem (2) for the binary-state case. It can be useful
to rewrite the objective with the density f (θ) explicitly in each term:


1

[(θf (θ) + F (θ)) q (θ) − max {q (θ) , 0} f (θ)] dθ.

0

This minor modiﬁcation highlights two important features of our problem: (i) the
constraint and the objective have generically diﬀerent weights, dθ and dF (θ); and (ii)
as a consequence, the problem is non separable in the type and the allocation, which
interact in two diﬀerent terms.
We therefore must consider the “virtual values” for each allocation q separately,
⎧
⎨θf (θ) + F (θ)
φ(θ, q) :=
⎩(θ − 1)f (θ) + F (θ)

for

q < 0,

for

q > 0.

The function φ(θ, q) takes on two values only due to the piecewise-linear objective
function. The two values represent the marginal beneﬁt to the seller (gross of the constraint) of increasing each type’s allocation from −1 to 0, and from 0 to 1, respectively.
We now let λ denote the multiplier on the integral constraint, and deﬁne the ironed
virtual value for experiment q as φ̄ (θ, q). We then can then reduce the seller’s problem
to the following maximization program.
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Proposition 1 (Optimal Allocation Rule).
Allocation q ∗ (θ) is optimal if and only if there exists λ∗ > 0 s.t. q ∗ (θ) solves


q

max

q∈[−1,1]

−1



φ̄ (θ, x) − λ

∗




dx

for all θ,

has the pooling property, and satisﬁes the integral constraint.
The solution to the seller’s problem is then obtained by combining standard Lagrange methods with the ironing procedure developed by Toikka (2011) that extends
the approach of Myerson (1981). In particular, Proposition 1 provides a characterization of the general solution, and suggests an algorithm to compute it.
To gain some intuition for the shape of the solution, observe that the problem is
piecewise-linear (but concave) in the allocation. Thus, absent the integral constraint,
the seller would choose an allocation that takes values at the kinks, i.e. q ∗ (θ) ∈
{−1, 0, 1} for all θ. In other words, the seller would oﬀer a one-experiment menu
consisting of a ﬂat price for the complete-information structure. It will indeed be
optimal for the seller to adopt ﬂat pricing in a number of circumstances. The main
novel result of this section is that the seller can (sometimes) do better by oﬀering one
additional experiment.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Menu).
An optimal menu consists of at most two experiments.
1. The ﬁrst experiment is fully informative.
2. The second experiment (contains a signal that) perfectly reveals one state.
We now separately examine the solution when one or two items are present in the
optimal menu.

4.1

Flat Pricing

We illustrate the procedure in an example where ironing is, in fact, not required. Let
√
F (θ) = θ, and consider the virtual values φ(θ, q) for q < 0 and q ≥ 0 separately.
The allocation that maximizes the expected virtual surplus in Proposition 1 assigns
q ∗ (θ) = −1 to all types θ for which φ(θ, −1) falls short of the multiplier λ; it assigns
q ∗ (θ) = 0 to all types θ for which φ(θ, −1) > λ > φ(θ, 1); and q ∗ (θ) = 1 for all types θ
for which φ(θ, 1) > λ.
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Figure 3: Optimal Menu: Flat Pricing
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Figure 3 (left panel) considers the virtual values and multiplier λ∗ . Figure 3 (right
panel) illustrates the resulting allocation rule. In order to satisfy the constraint, optimal value of the multiplier λ∗ must identify two symmetric threshold types (θ1 , θ2 )
that separate types receiving the eﬃcient allocation q = 0 from those receiving no
information at all, q = −1 or q = 1. It is then clear that, if virtual values are strictly
increasing, the optimal menu is given by charging the monopoly price for the fully
informative experiment.
The one-experiment result holds under weaker conditions than increasing virtual
values. We now derive suﬃcient conditions under which the solution q ∗ takes values in
{−1, 0, 1} only, i.e., conditions for the optimality of ﬂat pricing.
Proposition 3 (Flat Pricing).
Suppose any of the following conditions hold:
1. F (θ) + θf (θ) and F (θ) + (θ − 1)f (θ) are strictly increasing;
2. the density f (θ) = 0 for all θ > 1/2 or θ < 1/2;
3. the density f (θ) is symmetric around θ = 1/2.
The optimal menu contains only the fully informative experiment (q ∗ ≡ 0).
An implication of this result is that the seller oﬀers a second experiment only if
ironing is required (but it is easy to construct examples with non-monotone virtual
values and one-item menus).
Notice further that if q ∗ (1/2) = 0, all allocations q(θ) symmetric about 1/2 satisfy
the constraint automatically. That is because if the seller oﬀers just one experiment,
then one may recall from Figure 1 that the two marginal types will be symmetric about
1/2. Thus, if it is optimal to oﬀer a symmetric allocation rule, the constraint has no
bite.
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1.0



Figure 4 suggests the shape of the (symmetric) solution. Regardless of the properties of the distribution function F (θ), e.g. hazard rate, the solution to the restricted
problem is a cutoﬀ policy. Because the cutoﬀ is symmetric, it follows that the solutions
to the two subproblems satisfy the integral constraint, and hence provide a tight upper
bound to the seller’s proﬁts.

   









Figure 4: Symmetric Distribution and Allocation Rule

4.2

Discriminatory Pricing

We now illustrate the ironing procedure when virtual values are not monotone, and
how it leads to a richer (two-item) optimal menu. Consider a bimodal distribution of
types, which is given in this case by a linear combination of two Beta distributions.
The probability density function and associated virtual values are given in Figure 5.
Applying the procedure derived in Proposition 1, we consider the ironed versions of
each virtual value, and we identify the equilibrium value of the multiplier λ∗ . Notice
that in this case the multiplier must be at the ﬂat level of one of the virtual values:
suppose not, apply the procedure from the regular case, and verify that it is impossible
to satisfy the integral constraint.
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal two-item menu. Note that for types in the “pooling”
region (approximately θ ∈ [0.17, 0.55]), the level of the allocation (q ∗ ≈ −0.21) is
uniquely pinned down by the pooling property and by the integral constraint.
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Figure 5: Irregular Distribution
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Figure 6: Optimal Menu: Discriminatory Pricing
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In both examples, extreme types with low value of information are excluded from
purchase of informative signals. In the latter example, the monopolist is oﬀering a second information structure that is tailored towards relatively lower types. This structure
(with q < 0) contains one signal that perfectly reveals the high state. This experiment
is relatively unattractive for higher types, and it allows the monopolist to increase the
price for the large mass of types located around θ ≈ 0.7.
Moreover, note that type θ = 1/2 need not receive the most eﬃcient information
structure despite having the highest value of information. This is because, unlike in
Mussa and Rosen (1978), the highest type is not at one extreme of the distribution.
In particular, in the optimal menu, inducing the middle types to purchase the fully
informative experiment would require the monopolist to lower the price of the second experiment, leading to loss of revenue on the high-density types around θ ≈ 0.2.
Because there are so few types around 1/2 the monopolist prefers to distort their
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1.0



allocation instead.
In the next subsection, we oﬀer a precise characterization of the optimality of onevs. two-item menus in a two-type environment.

4.3

Two Types

We provide intuition for Proposition 2 through a two-type example. In particular,
let θ ∈ {0.2, 0.7} with equal probability. The optimal menu is then given by q ∗ (θ) ∈
{−1/5, 0}, with prices t∗ (θ) ∈ {8/25, 3/5}. In this example, the seller can oﬀer the fully
informative experiment q = 0 to the type with the highest valuation (i.e., θ = 0.7) and
extract the buyer’s entire surplus. In a canonical screening model, the seller would
now have to exclude the lower type θ = 0.2. However, when selling information, the
monopolist can design another experiment with undesirable properties for the high
type. In particular, the seller oﬀers an experiment which is relatively more informative
about the high state, and sets the price so to extract the low type’s surplus. The
optimal menu is then characterized by the most informative such experiment the seller
can oﬀer while extracting the entire surplus and without violating the high type’s
incentive-compatibility constraint. Figure 7 illustrates the value of the two experiments
oﬀered by the monopolist as a function of the buyer’s type θ ∈ [0, 1].
V-t
Partially Informative

1/2

2/10

0

7/10

1

θ
Fully Informative

t2
t1

t

Figure 7: Net Value of Experiment q
More generally, with two types, we know the optimal menu contains either one or
two experiments: if one only experiment is oﬀered, one or both types may purchase.
Oﬀering two experiments is optimal only if the two types are asymmetrically located on
opposite sides of 1/2. (Clearly, if they were at the same distance, the the seller would
obtain the ﬁrst-best proﬁts.) Moreover, the allocation is characterized by “no distortion
at the top,” and by full rent extraction whenever two experiments are oﬀered.5
5

The type θ closer to 1/2 buys the perfectly informative experiment. This will no longer be true with
more than two types.
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Which distribution of types would the seller like to face? Notice that the horizontal
diﬀerentiation aspect introduces a trade-oﬀ in the seller’s preferences between value of
information and ability to screen diﬀerent types (i.e., value creation vs. appropriation).
Screening becomes easier when types are located farther apart. Finally, observe that
seller may beneﬁt from mean-preserving spread of F (θ). This seemingly counterintuitive result may happen when the seller sells information only to the less informed
type. Thus the ex ante Blackwell more informative structure may leave the buyer be
interim less informed. This translates into higher proﬁts for the seller, but it does not
imply she would like to give out free information.
We summarize our results with two types. Let θ ∈ {θ1 , θ2 } with the corresponding
frequency μ  Pr (θ = θ1 ). We assume without loss that θ1 ≤ 1/2 and that the ﬁrst
type is less informed, i.e., |θ1 − 1/2| ≤ |θ2 − 1/2|. Finally, we deﬁne the following
threshold:
μ̄ 

1 − θ2
,
1 − θ1

and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 (Two Types).
The optimal menu with two types is the following:
(a) if |θ2 − 1/2| = |θ1 − 1/2|, then
q ∗ (θ) ≡ 0;
(b) if |θ2 − 1/2| > |θ1 − 1/2|, then
q ∗ (θ1 ) = q ∗ (θ2 ) ⇐⇒ μ > μ̄;
(c) if |θ2 − 1/2| > |θ1 − 1/2| and θ2 > 1/2, then
0 = q ∗ (θ1 ) < q ∗ (θ2 ) < 1.
To conclude, we remark that the solution with two types can always be reconciled
with the general case, and found using the integral constraint. In particular, because
we can assume that the fully uninformative information structure is always present in
the mechanism at zero price, we can construct the optimal allocation rule q ∗ (θ) deﬁned
on the entire unit interval in order to satisfy the integral constraint. Not surprisingly
then, the allocation rule resembles that of Figure 6, though the discreteness of this
examples introduces an additional discontinuity.
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Figure 8: Optimal Allocation: Two Experiments (q ∈ {−1/5, 0})

4.4

Continuum of States

Moving to the case of a continuous state variable ω, it can be useful to focus attention
on the following interpretation: a buyer is uncertain about the proﬁtability of a project,
and decides whether to invest or not. In particular, let the state space be Ω = R, the
binary action set A = {aL , aH }, and identify the state ω ∈ Ω with the incremental
value of taking the high action aH , so that the ex-post utility is given by
u (a, ω) =

⎧
⎨ω,

a = aH ,

⎩0,

a = aL .

The buyer’s private information is captured by his type θ ∈ R that characterizes his
interim beliefs, g (ω | θ). We normalize the type to represent the interim proﬁtability
of a project so E [ω | θ] = θ.
Thus, the optimal action under prior information is aH if and only if θ ≥ 0. The
resulting reservation utility is given by
u (θ) = max {0, θ} .
Unlike in the case of binary state, there is no reason to restrict a priori the set of
experiments included in any optimal menu. For now, we concentrate a natural onedimensional class of partitions {E (q)}q∈R , with the generic element E (q) revealing
whether ω is above or below q. (Unlike for the case of heterogeneous tastes), the
buyer’s belief type aﬀects his perception of an experiment. Thus, it changes both
marginal probabilities of signals and posterior means. Therefore, the posterior means
following a signal realization depend on the buyer’s type as well as on the experiment.

18

We deﬁne
μ0 (q, θ) :=E [ω | ω ≤ q, θ] ,
μ1 (q, θ) :=E [ω | ω > q, θ] .
We complete the class by letting E (±∞) represent the fully uninformative experiments.
We now derive the value of a generic experiment E (q) for type θ. If the experiment
has positive value, it induces the buyer to invest only upon realization of the high
signal. Therefore, it is straightforward to calculate


∞

V (q, θ) =
q

+
ωg (ω | θ) dω − max {0, θ} .

For a given experiment, the value function is generally non-linear and single-peaked at
θ = 0. For a given type, the value function has the highest value of fully informative
experiment at q = 0 and vanishes at inﬁnity.
Unfortunately, the information value V (q, θ) does not satisfy the monotone hazard
rate condition in general. Indeed,
∂g (ω | θ)
∂ 2 V (q, θ)
= −q
∂q∂θ
∂θ

.
ω=q

For example, consider the case of an unbiased estimator (θ = ω + ), where the distribution of the error is single-peaked at zero. In this case ∂g (ω | θ) /∂θ ≤ 0 for ω < θ
and ∂g (ω | θ) /∂θ ≥ 0 for ω > θ so that the condition ∂ 2 V (q, θ) /∂q∂θ ≥ 0 is equivalent to requiring q ∈ [0, θ]. However, there is no reason to believe an optimal menu
would assign allocations in this interval only. The following result is an immediate
consequence of the this analysis.
Lemma 4 (Single Crossing).
The value of information V (q, θ) satisﬁes the single-crossing property globally if and
only if
∂g (ω|θ)
≥ (≤) 0
∂θ
∂g (ω|θ)
≤ (≥) 0
∂θ

∀ ω > 0,
∀ ω < 0.

The condition states that higher types θ must attach uniformly greater probability
for positive states. The condition of Lemma 4 holds in the following example where
the interim distribution of beliefs is a skewed uniform distribution.
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Example Let θ ∈ [−1/3, 1/3] be uniformly distributed and the interim beliefs of
type θ be distributed on Ω = [−1, 1] according to
g (ω | θ) =

1 + 3θω
.
2

We can verify that E [ω | θ] = θ holds and that the density g(ω | θ) satisﬁes the
conditions of Lemma 4. The value of information is given by
+



2θ + 1 − q 2
1
− max {0, θ}
V (q, θ) = − θq 3 +
2
4

.

The incentive compatibility condition requires that q (θ) be weakly decreasing in θ.
However, the rent function V (θ) is again single-peaked in θ with a maximum at θ = 0.
This introduces the familiar integral constraint


1/3

q (s)3 ds = 0,

(3)

−1/3

and leads to a solution that is analogous to the binary-state case.
In particular, as we show in Appendix B, the optimal solution is characterized
by ﬂat pricing whenever virtual values are monotone: all types θ that purchase the
information receive the information that enables them to achieve the ex post eﬃcient
decision. In other words, q ∗ (θ) = 0 for all participating types. The set of participating
types is an interval centered around 0. Therefore, the solution is in line with our
ﬁndings in Proposition 3.
In contrast, when virtual values are not monotone, the allocation is distorted for
a positive measure of types, and does not involve more than two distinct information
structures, as in Proposition 2.

5

Heterogeneous Tastes

Here we examine the model where agents have private information over their (positive
or negative) bias for the high action aH . For the case of binary states, we can adapt
our analysis from the model with heterogeneous beliefs. For the case of continuous
states and regular distribution of types, we can characterize the optimal menu.

5.1

Binary State

We consider the case of a binary state ω, and we let p denote the common prior belief
that the state is high, p = Pr (ω = ωH ). We then let the buyer’s private information
be his “bias” θ ∈ [0, 1], which enters the ex-post utility of choosing the “high action”
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in such a way that the extreme types have weakly dominant strategies:
u(aH , θ, ω)  θ − 1[ω = ωL ].
It is well-known that in this context, the type with the highest value of information
is θ = 1 − p. Furthermore, easy algebra shows that the natural analog of the allocation
measure for belief heterogeneity is
q(θ)  2pα(θ) − 2(1 − p)β(θ).
We can then apply the same derivation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementability, and formulate the seller’s problem as follows:
1 


max
q(θ)

0

F (θ)
θ+
f (θ)




q (θ) − max {q (θ) , 0} f (θ) dθ,

s.t. q (θ) ∈ [−2(1 − p), 2p] non-decreasing,
 1
q (θ) dθ = 4p − 2 =: q ∗ (p).
0

Note that the seller’s problem with heterogeneous buyer tastes is identical to the
case of heterogeneous beliefs for p = 1/2. Our earlier results apply, and hence the
optimal menu contains q ∗ (p) and at most one q̄(p) = q ∗ (p). Furthermore, we can show
that the second experiment (if present) becomes relatively more informative about state
ωL if the buyer’s prior belief over state ωH increases. This is clear from the discussion
of buyers’ relative preferences for signals that induce a change in their action. We
formalize this intuition and discuss its welfare consequences in the following result.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics – Binary State).
1. The relative informativeness of the second experiment q̄(p) is increasing in p.
2. The overall informativeness of the second experiment is increasing in p if and
only if q̄(p) < q ∗ (p).

5.2

Continuous States

For the case of a continuum of states, we assume the ex-post utility of buyer type θ is
given by
u (a, ω, θ) =

⎧
⎨ω − θ,

a = aH ,

⎩0,

a = aL .

We assume that states ω are distributed on the entire real line according to G(ω).
The buyer’s type θ is also distributed on the real line according to F (θ). We assume
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that the distribution of types has a log-concave density f (θ). As noted by Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005) and Eső and Szentes (2007b), a log-concave density implies that
Φ (θ, λ) := θ −

λ − F (θ)
f (θ)

is strictly increasing in θ for all λ ∈ (0, 1). We then have the following characterization
of an optimal menu for regular (i.e., log-concave) distributions.
Proposition 6 (Heterogeneous Tastes – Continuum of States).
The optimal allocation rule and payment function are given by
q ∗ (θ) = Φ (θ, λ∗ ) ,
 q∗ (θ)

∗
t (θ) =
q ∗−1 (ω) − ω dG (ω) ,
−∞

where λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique root of


∞



−∞


ω − Φ−1 (ω, λ∗ ) dG (ω) = 0.

We illustrate the result in an example. Let ω ∼ N (0, 1) and θ ∼ N (0, 1). The
value of the multiplier is then λ∗ = 1/2. The corresponding optimal allocation rule
and price are given in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Optimal Menu with Continuous States
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Conclusions

We have examined the problem of a monopolist selling incremental information to privately informed buyers. The optimal mechanism involves at most two experiments,
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2

and we obtain suﬃcient conditions for one-item menus to be optimal. From the point
of view of selling information, even under costless acquisition and free degrading, the
optimal menu is quite coarse: this suggests a limited use of versioning, and the profitability of “minimal” distortions, in the absence of further, observable, heterogeneity
among buyers or cost-eﬃciency reasons to provide impartially informative signals.
The comparative statics of the seller’s proﬁts with respect to the distribution of
types underscore a trade-oﬀ between value of information (to the buyer) and ability to
screen (for the seller). For instance, the ex-ante least informed types are not necessarily
the most valuable, nor do they purchase the most informative signals in equilibrium.
For the binary model, we have shown the equivalence between an environment with
heterogeneous tastes for actions and one with heterogeneous beliefs. More work is
required to clarify the role of orthogonal vs. correlated information that underscores
the diﬀerence between preferences vs. beliefs heterogeneity with a continuum of states.
Further interesting extensions include studying the following: the optimal menu
when the buyer is informed about an ex-ante type (e.g., about his private information
structure, before observing any signals); the role of information-acquisition costs for the
seller (which do not play a signiﬁcant role if ﬁxed or linear in precision, but may induce
further cost-based screening if convex in the quality of the information released to the
buyer); and the eﬀect of competition among sellers of information (i.e. formalizing the
intuition that each seller will be able to extract the surplus related to the innovation
element of his database).
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Appendix
A

Proofs for Section 3

Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the following procedure. Fix any type θ and experiment
a denote the sets of the signals in experiment E that induce type θ to choose
E. Let SE
a = S . Construct the experiment E  as a recommendation for
action a. Thus, ∪a∈A SE
E

type θ based on the experiment E, SE  = {sa }a∈A and

πE  (sa |ω) =

a
SE

πE (s | ω) ds

ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A.

By construction, E  induces the same outcome distribution for type θ as E so V (E  , θ) =
V (E, θ). At the same time, E  is a garbling of E so by Blackwell’s theorem V (E  , θ ) ≤
V (E, θ ) ∀ θ .
We can use this procedure to construct for any feasible direct mechanism {E (θ) , t (θ)}
another feasible direct mechanism {E  (θ) , t (θ)} with its experiments consisting of no
more signals than the cardinality of action space A. Because we consider a binary
setting, every experiment in an optimal menu consists of two signals only.



Proof of Lemma 2. Consider any feasible direct mechanism M = {α (θ) , β (θ) , t (θ)}.
For each θ deﬁne ε (θ) := 1 − max {α, β}, α (θ) := α (θ) + ε (θ) , and β  (θ) := β (θ) +
ε (θ). It follows from the information value formula that

+

V α (θ) , β  (θ) , θ − ε (θ) = V (α (θ) , β (θ) , θ) .
Consequently, a direct mechanism M = {α (θ) , β  (θ) , t (θ) + ε (θ)} is feasible, for any
type θ either α (θ) = 1 or β (θ) = 1, and all transfers are weakly greater than in M. 

Proof of Lemma 3. Since each type’s outside option coincides with the value of
choosing an uninformative experiment, we drop the positivity qualiﬁer in the formula
for value function and set q (0) = −1 and q (1) = 1.
Necessity. For any two types θ2 > θ1 we have
V (q1 , θ1 ) − t1 ≥ V (q2 , θ1 ) − t2 ,
V (q2 , θ2 ) − t2 ≥ V (q1 , θ2 ) − t1 ,
V (q2 , θ2 ) − V (q1 , θ2 ) ≥ t2 − t1 ≥ V (q2 , θ1 ) − V (q1 , θ1 ) .
It follows from the single-crossing property of V (q, θ) that q2 ≥ q1 hence q (θ) is
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increasing. Because the buyer’s rent is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in θ on [0, 1/2]
and [1/2, 1] respectively, we can compute the function U (θ) on [0, 1/2] and [1/2, 1]
separately as


1/2

U (1/2) = U (0) +
0


Vθ (q, θ) dθ = U (1) −

1
1/2

Vθ (q, θ) dθ.

By the envelope theorem Vθ (q, θ) = q + 1 for θ < 1/2 and = q − 1 for θ > 1/2. Taking
into account the boundary conditions U (0) = U (1) = 0 we obtain


1

q (θ) dθ = 0.
0

The corresponding transfers can be derived from the allocation rule as
 θ
 
U (θ) = V (q (θ) , θ) − t (θ) = 0 +
q θ dθ + min {θ, 1 − θ}
0
 θ
  
q θ dθ − max {q (θ) , 0} .
t (θ) = q (θ) θ −
0

Suﬃciency. Expected utility for a type θ from reporting θ is
   
  
  
V q θ , θ − t θ = θ − θ q θ +



θ

q (θ) dθ + min {θ, 1 − θ}

0

which is maximized at θ = θ by monotonicity of q (·); incentive constraints are satisﬁed.
At the same time U (θ) is equal to zero for types 0 and 1 and is weakly positive for all
others; participation constraints are satisﬁed.

B



Proofs for Section 4

Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the seller’s problem (2). We ﬁrst establish that
the solution can be characterized through Lagrangean methods. For necessity, note
that the objective is concave in the allocation rule; the set of non-decreasing functions
is convex; and the integral constraint can be weakened to the real-valued inequality
constraint



1

q(θ)dθ ≤ 0.

(4)

0

Necessity of the Lagrangean then follows from Theorem 8.3.1 in Luenberger (1969).
Suﬃciency follows from Theorem 8.4.1 in Luenberger (1969). In particular, any solution
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maximizer of the Lagrangean q(θ) with


1

q(θ)dθ = q̄
0

maximizes the original objective subject to the inequality constraint


1

q(θ)dθ ≤ q̄.

0

Thus, any solution to the Lagrangean that satisﬁes the constraint also solves the original problem.
Because the Lagrangean approach is valid, we can apply the results of Toikka (2011)
to the solve the seller’s problem for a given value of the multiplier λ on the integral
constraint. Write the Lagrangean as


1

[(θf (θ) + F (θ)) q (θ) − (max {q (θ) , 0} + λ)f (θ)] dθ.

0

In order to maximize the Lagrangean subject to the monotonicity constraint, consider
the generalized virtual surplus

¯ q) :=
J(θ,

q
−1




φ̄ (θ, x) − λ∗ dx,

¯ q) is
where φ̄ (θ, x) denotes the ironed virtual value for allocation x. Note that J(θ,
weakly concave in q. Because the multiplier λ shifts all virtual values by a constant,
the result in Proposition 1 then follows from Theorem 4.4 in Toikka (2011). Finally,
¯
note that phi(θ,
q) ≥ 0 for all θ implies the value λ∗ is strictly positive (otherwise the
solution q ∗ would have a strictly positive integral). Therefore, the integral constraint


(4) binds.

Proof of Proposition 2. From the Lagrangean maximization, we have the following
necessary conditions
⎧
⎪
−1
if φ̄(θ, −1) < λ∗ ,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
q̄ ∈ [−1, 0] if φ̄(θ, −1) = λ∗ ,
⎪
⎨
q ∗ (θ) = 0
if φ̄(θ, −1) > λ∗ > φ̄(θ, 1),
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪q̄  ∈ [0, 1]
if φ̄(θ, 1) = λ∗ ,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩1
if φ̄(θ, −1) > λ∗ ,
and



1

q ∗ (θ)dθ = 0.

0
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If λ∗ coincides with the ﬂat portion of one virtual value, then by the pooling property
of Myerson (1981), the optimal allocation rule must be constant over that interval, and
the level of the allocation is uniquely determined by the integral constraint. Finally,
suppose λ∗ equals the value of φ̄(θ, q ∗ (θ)) over more than one ﬂat portion of the virtual
values φ̄(θ, −1) and φ̄(θ, 1). Then we can focus without loss on the allocation q ∗ that
assigns experiment q = 0 or q ∈ {−1, 1} to all types in one of the two intervals.



Proof of Proposition 3. (1.) If F (θ) + θf (θ) and F (θ) + (θ − 1) f (θ) are strictly
increasing then the ironing is not required and it follows from the analysis in the text
that the optimal solution has a single step at q = 0.
(2.) If all types are located at one side from 1/2 then the integral constraint has no
bite since the allocation rule q (θ) can always be adjusted on the other side to satisfy
it. The unconstrained problem has a single step at q = 0 that results in ﬂat pricing.
(3.) If types are symmetrically distributed then the separately optimal menus for types
θ < 1/2 and θ > 1/2 are the same. Since the proﬁts in the jointly optimal menu cannot
be higher than weighted sum of proﬁts in the separate ones the result follows.



Example with Continuous States. The rent function V is non-decreasing in θ on
[−1/3, 0] and non-increasing on [0, 1/3] . Thus, the individual rationality constraint will
bind at θ ∈ {−1/3, 1/3} , if anywhere. Conjecture (and verify ex-post) that the indirect
utility of the extreme types satisﬁes U (−1/3) = U (1/3) = 0. We can then write the
rent function as
U (θ) =
U (θ) =

1
2
1
2






θ

−1/3
1/3 


1 − q (s)3 ds, for θ ≤ 0,


1 + q (s)3 ds, for θ > 0.

θ

Continuity at θ = 0 implies once more that


1/3

q (s)3 ds = 0,

(5)

−1/3

which we maintain as an additional constraint.
Writing out the transfers, integrating by parts, and using the constraint (5) yields
the following problem for the monopolist:


1/3

max
q(θ)



−1/3
1/3

s.t.

 

q (θ)2
− θq (θ) +
2
3




f (θ) − q (θ) F (θ) dθ

q (s)3 ds = 0, q (θ) non-increasing.

−1/3
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3

Let λ denote the multiplier on the integral constraint, and write the Lagrangean as

L (θ) = −q (θ)

2


f (θ)
+ q (θ) (F (θ) + θf (θ) − λ) .
2

Now notice that, in order to maximize the Lagrangean with respect to q (θ), the monopolist should set
⎧
⎪
⎨ 1
q (θ) =
0
⎪
⎩
−1

if

F (θ) + θf (θ) +

if

F (θ) + θf (θ) +

if

F (θ) + θf (θ) +

f (θ)
2
f (θ)
2
f (θ)
2

<λ
∈ [λ, λ + f (θ)]

(6)

> λ + f (θ) .

]In other words, the monopolist’s problem (for a given λ) is equivalent to


1/3

max
q(θ)

−1/3




−q (θ) F (θ) + θf (θ) +



f (θ)
− λ + f (θ) min {q, 0} dθ
2

s.t.q (θ) non-increasing.
This problem is weakly concave in q, so the procedure from the binary-state case
applies. In particular, the solution again consists of at most two information structures.
Furthermore, if both virtual values
f (θ)
,
2
f (θ)
F (θ) + θf (θ) −
2
F (θ) + θf (θ) +

are increasing, then the allocation (6) is weakly decreasing in θ for all λ. Therefore, in
this case the value of the multiplier λ∗ is such that the integral constraint is satisﬁed.
(This requires ﬁnding two types θ1 = −θ2 such that both virtual values are equal to
λ.) The optimal solution in this case leads again to a ﬂat pricing solution in which
all types θ that purchase the information receive the information that enables them
to achieve the ex post eﬃcient decision. Now suppose that the virtual values are not
increasing. Then the method of ironing pointwise in q again leads to two ironed virtual
values, and to a procedure similar to the binary case.
For concreteness, if F (θ) is uniform, then the optimal ﬂat price is p∗ = 1/8, leading
to the allocation q ∗ (θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [−1/4, 1/4] and to q ∗ (θ) ∈ {−1, 1} outside that
interval. If F (θ) is given by the distribution used in the Section 4.2 and Figure 5, the
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optimal menu is given by
⎧
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ .14
q (θ) =
⎪ 0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
−1

C

for

θ ≈ [−1/3, −0.19]

for

θ ≈ [−0.19, 0.03]

for

θ ≈ [0.03, 0.16]

for

θ ≈ [.16, 1/3] .

Proofs for Section 5

For the case of heterogeneous tastes and a continuum of states, we ﬁrst characterize
the set of implementable allocations in the Lemma 5. Recall that in what follows, for
a function x (y) we deﬁne x (−∞) := limy→−∞ x (y) , and x (∞) := limy→∞ x (y) .
Lemma 5 (Implementable Allocations).
The mechanism q (θ) , t (θ) ≥ 0 is incentive compatible and individually rational if and
only if
q (θ) is non-decreasing,
q (−∞) = −∞, q (∞) = ∞,
 q(θ)

t (θ) =
q −1 (ω) − ω dG (ω) ∀ θ ∈ R,
−∞

t (−∞) = 0,

t (∞) = 0.

Proof of Lemma 5. Necessity. Monotonicity of the allocation rule follows from the
increasing diﬀerences property of V (q, θ). Our deﬁnition of uninformative experiments
as long as the fact that the value of any experiment goes to zero as θ goes to inﬁnities
leads to q (±∞) = ±∞. Individual rationality then implies that transfers are going to
zero too as long as θ goes to inﬁnities, t (±∞) = 0. Deﬁne the indirect utility


   
     
θG q θ +
V q θ , θ −t θ = max
U (θ) := max


θ

θ

∞
q(θ  )


 
ωdG (ω) − t θ −max {μ, θ} .

By the fundamental theorem of calculus followed by the envelope theorem applied to
the ﬁrst term



θ

U (θ) = μ +
−∞

G (q (z)) dz − max {μ, θ} .

It follows that

t (θ) = θG (q (θ)) −

= θG (q (θ)) −

q(θ)
−∞

q(θ)
−∞


ωdG (ω) −

θ

G (q (z)) dz
−∞

ωdG (ω) − zG (q (z)) |θ−∞ +
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θ

zdG (q (z))
−∞



q(θ)

=
−∞


q −1 (ω) − ω dG (ω) .

where, the second line is obtained with integration by parts and the third line follows
from monotonicity of q (·).
Suﬃciency. For IC, given the allocation and payment rules
   
  
V q θ , θ = θG q θ +



q(θ  )

  
= θG q θ −




∞

q(θ  )



ωdG (ω) −
q(θ  )

−∞

q(θ  )
−∞


q −1 (ω) − ω dG (ω) − max {μ, θ}

q −1 (ω) dG (ω) − max {0, θ − μ}


θ − q −1 (ω) dG (ω) − max {0, θ − μ} .

=
−∞

By monotonicity of q (·), θ ≥ q −1 (ω) if and only if ω ≤ q (θ). Therefore, truth-telling
is optimal. For IR, as shown above


q(θ)

V (q (θ) , θ) =
−∞


θ − q −1 (ω) dG (ω) − max {0, θ − μ} .

By monotonicity of q (·), θ ≥ q −1 (ω) for all ω ≤ q (θ) so


q(θ)


θ − q −1 (ω) dG (ω) ≥ 0

−∞

Furthermore,



∞

t (∞) =
−∞

∀ θ.


q −1 (ω) − ω dG (ω) = 0

so


q(θ)
−∞

θ−q

−1





∞

(ω) dG (ω) =
−∞


=θ−μ−

q(θ)
−∞

θ−q

−1



(ω) + ω − ω dG (ω)−


θ − q −1 (ω) dG (ω) ≥ θ − μ



∞
q(θ)


θ − q −1 (ω) dG (ω)

∀ θ.

The last inequality follows from the monotonicity of q (·). Thus, for all θ, it holds that
V (q (θ) , θ) ≥ 0.



Proof of Proposition 6. The value of experiment E (q) for type θ is
V (q, θ) = (1 − G (q)) (μ1 (q) − θ) − max {0, μ − θ}
if θ ∈ [μ0 , μ1 ] and zero otherwise. We can now use characterization of implementable
allocations in Lemma 5 to calculate the expected proﬁts from the mechanism with
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allocation rule q (θ):

π=

=

∞



t (θ) f (θ) dθ =


=



∞
−∞
∞



−∞
∞



−∞
q −1 (ω)
 ∞
 −1

q

−∞

q(θ) 
−∞



q

−1





(ω) − ω g (ω) dω f (θ) dθ


q −1 (ω) − ω g (ω) f (θ) dθ dω

(ω) − ω





1 − F q −1 (ω) g (ω) dω

= E [(Θ (ω) − ω) (1 − F (Θ (ω)))]
where Θ (ω) := q −1 (ω) and the expectation is taken with respect to ω. Note that the
feasibility conditions can be rewritten in terms of Θ (ω) as Θ (ω) being non-decreasing,
Θ (−∞) = −∞, Θ (∞) = ∞, and EΘ (ω) = Eω = μ. Therefore, the maximization
problem of the seller can be stated as

max
Θ(ω)

s.t.

E [(ω − Θ (ω)) F (Θ (ω))]
E Θ (ω) = E ω
Θ (ω) is non-decreasing,
Θ (−∞) = −∞, Θ (∞) = ∞.

Consider the relaxed problem


∞

max
Θ(ω)

−∞
∞

s.t.
−∞

(ω − Θ (ω)) F (Θ (ω)) g (ω) dω
(ω − Θ (ω)) g (ω) dω = 0.

This is a standard isoperimetric problem studied in the calculus of variations with the
corresponding Euler equation
−F (Θ (ω)) g (ω) + f (Θ (ω)) (ω − Θ (ω)) g (ω) + λg (ω) = 0 ∀ ω ∈ R
that can be rewritten as
ω = Θ (ω) −

λ − F (Θ (ω))
=: Φ (Θ (ω) , λ)
f (Θ (ω))

∀ ω ∈ R.

(7)

Note that Φ (θ, 1) is just the virtual valuation of a type θ. The log-concavity assumption
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on f (·) ensures that the optimal rule is increasing and can be written as
Θ (ω) = Φ−1 (ω, λ)
where the inversion is on θ. Plugging it into the integral constraint we obtain


∞
−∞




ω − Φ−1 (ω, λ) g (ω) dω = 0.

We claim that there exists unique λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that satisﬁes this equation. First, by (7),
ω > Θ (ω) ∀ ω ∈ R at λ = 0 and ω < Θ (ω) ∀ ω ∈ R at λ = 1 . Therefore,


∞



−∞
∞


ω − Φ−1 (ω, 0) g (ω) dω > 0,




ω − Φ−1 (ω, 1) g (ω) dω < 0.

−∞

The integral is continuous in λ so the existence of λ∗ follows from the intermediate value
theorem. Second, notice that Φ (Θ (ω) , λ) is strictly decreasing in λ so the integral is
strictly decreasing in λ. It thus follows that λ∗ is unique. Finally note that since Θ (ω)
was deﬁned as q −1 (ω) so the optimal allocation for type θ is just Φ (θ, λ).
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